Blog - December 4, 2005 - May 19, 2006

A Run for Congress in 2006?

“TROUBLE IS…”

WHY REPUBLICAN VOTERS IN 2006 WON’T SEE A PRIMARY CHALLENGER TO THE INCUMBENT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE’S 1^st CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Up to about mid-April, I labored for over six months to see whether it would be possible to mount a challenge to Jeb Bradley, the incumbent U.S. Representative of NH CD1 in Washington. First, via the interactive e-mail group of the NH Republican Liberty Caucus (RLC), I tried to drum up a candidate from among Republican conservatives and the House Republican Alliance, a group of conservative Republican legislators in the NH House. No luck, so I then turned to see whether I could put together a campaign myself.

One trouble of mine is (and was) that I take (took) the substance of a potential race too seriously. Whereas the political pro’s and media mavens think first in terms of strategy and tactics, I tend to pay priority attention to the “Why” question -- Why are you running? -- and to issues -- What are the major issues; what do I have to say on these that is both different from the incumbent and responsive to the people of my congressional district? What would be my “message” to voters? I should have devoted most of my time to raising money and building a team from the outset.

Another mistake I made was engaging a political consultant and giving up over $3,000 of precious funds that I could ill-afford to spend. Let’s give credit where credit is due, however: The consultant in question is the one who first saw that a Republican incumbent could be challenged with a chance to make some serious hay and even to win. He was fixated on Iraq as the overriding, #1, cutting-edge issue, also rightly fully so, as events unfolded; and this focus drove his view of what he saw as my main chance: To run against Bush, against the war and against the incumbent as a Bush puppet.

My stance on Iraq was not so simple: Although I had been opposed to our invasion of Iraq, even before the War Resolution of Congress was passed five months prior to the invasion, the fact of our being in Iraq made a big difference. After all, I was a Republican who believed that spreading democracy worldwide was an inspiring national goal, one that represented a big change in U.S. policy. During the Cold War, we had supported a number of tinpot dictators worldwide as long as they said they were against Communism.

Having been in Iraq to help build democracy and development, and having read some books and articles on Iraq, I had some experience and sense of both the positives and negatives of our Iraq policy. So, I spent a lot of time trying to wrestle the issues to the ground, torn between the political opportunity that the consultant held out to me -- that a campaign based on four-square opposition to Bush’s Iraq policy would generate reams of free publicity to jump-start a campaign for Congress -- and the opportunity that the policy itself presented: that our efforts to democratize and develop Iraq, with a wish and a prayer, might just work, while the consequences of withdrawal could be disastrous.

The nub of the dilemma was my strong feeling that the efforts invested and lives sacrificed by Americans in Iraq should not have been in vain. I carried with me the image of one Lt. Hoes, shot by a sniper while distributing pamphlets urging Iraqis to vote during the first Iraqi nationwide election in 50 years. My campaign was to be dedicated to him.

I was also influenced by the election drama. Each of three featured a voter turnout of 58-70%, turnout rates that put voter participation in our own country to shame -- turnouts in spite of the risks of having a suicide bombers standing next to voters in polling place lines. Each of the elections revealed the hopes of the Iraqi people and raised the hopes of the American people. They were run-ups to the formation of a democratically elected government for Iraq. Unfortunately, the ability of Iraqi politicians to actually form a government that could promote both security and development remains questionable to this day (May 19, 2006), even though the formalities of government formation are to be announced tomorrow -- more than five (5!) months after the last election!

Meanwhile, casualties rise, violence shows no sign of abating and a sectarian civil war has apparently begun. Reluctantly, and too slowly, I came to the conclusion that U.S. intervention in Iraq could not succeed on the basis of Bush Administration policies. Though nor have we failed. We have enforced “regime change.” We have given the Iraqis the taste and many of the tools of a democratic system. What we had been unable to do is to provide the most essential ingredient -- physical safety and security that are essential to democracy and development. The gamut of our experience in Iraq from March, 2003 to the present revealed that we have no chance to “win” without adding many more troops in Iraq and so expending much more treasure in lives and dollars.

So, not only are the “Coalition” forces in Iraq far too few to “do the job” but we, the American people, have not been engaged as participants in an American “war of choice,” even though it’s being fought in our name. It’s our war but not our war -- our war as a country but not ours as a people. We have been asked to “go shop,” not to make any sacrifices as a nation, those that would truly help American soldiers fully fulfill their mission, so that lives lost truly are not given in vain. We do not even have to sacrifice our tax cuts. Anyway, we would hardly feel the “sacrifice” since the overwhelming bulk of the benefits of the cuts redound to so few of us.

Thus, after agonizing over the war for several months, I came to the reluctant conclusion noted earlier and so outlined an alternative Iraq policy with a “timetable” for troops’ withdrawal (as revealed in my December 3, 2005 “Bearse’s Blog” entry). “Responsibility” is a key word in this policy as in other areas of concern. We have both an internal and worldwide responsibility to take great care to ensure the security of the American people, a responsibility our government didn‘t honor prior to 9/11 and still doesn’t adequately fulfill. We don’t have a responsibility to take care of the Iraqi people; they do. It’s neither good policy nor consistent with American values to treat the Iraqis as a client population -- a welfare state needing constant support. The war in Iraq threatens soon to become longer than any other war in our history. Enough is enough and “enough” has already been too much when our resources are strained to take care of our own responsibilities within and without. Let’s declare victory now that the Iraqis have their sovereignty and a democratic government owing to our help thus far.

But there was still the big challenge -- the one I should have turned to immediately but started to address too late -- the challenge of mobilizing money and people to mount a credible campaign. Not that I needed to raise a million bucks like that raised and spent by the incumbent his last time out. That’s obscene. This kind of money fueling campaigns for Congress is what makes it “the best Congress that money can buy,” certainly not the people’s branch of government that it’s supposed to be. Almost by definition -- because money buys access that over 95% of the American people cannot afford -- we have a corrupt Congress, no matter whether the fundraising practices of any one Member are legal or not. No, I aim for a people-based politics and a Congress that represents US - the great American majority. I also aim to show that an American of very modest means (one subsisting on Social Security plus a small pension) can make a serious run for Congress. After all, how can we have a government that is for people if we do not have a politics that is of them and by them?

I needed a team to conduct a people-based campaign -- one fueled by citizen volunteers, not big bucks. That doesn’t mean money is moot. The foot soldiers of a political campaign need to be supplied with campaign materials, just as army soldiers need to be supplied with the materiel of war. So, I needed to be able raise enough money to create, produce and supply campaign materials. The amount needed would be in the order of a hundred thousand dollars. This is far less than the average, increasingly inflated costs of congressional campaigns, now approaching the million dollar level that Jeb Bradley reached two years ago. The costs keep rising at a far greater pace than the rate of inflation because of the incestuous mix of money and media that major political campaigns have become. This mix includes people as, at best, minor actors, bit players on a political stage dominated by political pros and careerists.

Yet, in my politics, “people” are necessarily the key actors. There’s the rub. For in the final analysis, my decision not to take the plunge rested more on expectations of people than of money. I wanted to be able to mount a campaign that honored the new/old people-based politics represented by my experience and advocated by my book. I wanted to maximize the role of people in politics and minimize the role of money. But then I faced a political dilemma similar to the question faced by a “spec” developer -- If I build it, will they come? If I mount a campaign designed to enable people to make a difference -- to take back what should, after all, be their politics -- will they really step forward to “get involved”?? What if my hope and faith in people are misplaced?

None of the tea leaves that I had been reading led me to be hopeful. I had been intensively involved, as a volunteer, in two late winter special election campaigns, only to find that fellow Republicans were asleep. Voter turnouts were miserably low. Too many people I talked to reflected apathy and indifference, even unto cynicism. So, the cutting edge decision-question became: Would I take a chance -- step forward, put my butt out there into the public arena, and hope that enough people would respond to what, after all, would be a very un-conventional candidacy? Perhaps to my discredit, reflecting too little of the sort of political-entrepreneurial courage I so admire and have fancied myself to have, I finally answered the question “No.”

Twenty-two (22) years ago, I had raised about $100,000 for my campaign for Congress, and still got outspent 4:1! But that was in a state where I had already run for and won local offices, run for and lost a State Senate seat, and built a political base. Here I was, a New Hampshire nouveau arrivee‘, only 2 years in the place, without a base and starting late. Anyway, the long and short of this saga is that I ended at the short end of the political stick -- unable to manage a declaration of political faith and courage, raise enough money or build a team. The written fruits of my labors, such as they are, can be found online via www.BearseforCongress.com. The real fruits -- the acid test of whether people can work to take back their politics, even in a single Congressional District -- is yet to come. 2008?

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